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<i>Ex Ante</i> and <i>ex Post</i> Voting Power: A Method for Calculating Party Power in Party Government
Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
- 1 Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
- 2 Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
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Abstract
As political power tends to be wielded in the form of voting power in the national assembly, especially under the institutions of party government, one needs a method to calculate the voting power of political parties, both longitudinally and for a cross-section of European democracies. This paper suggests such a method, derived from the power index approach in cooperative game theory. The application of the method on the history of democracy in the two German nations results in party scores — mandates, ex ante and ex post voting power — that are much in congruence with the standard interpretations of the interwar period and the post-war politics in these two countries.
KeywordsParty GovernmentGovernment Coalitions and Coalitions in the Legislature<i>Ex Ante</i>and <i>ex Post</i>Voting PowerPenrose-Banzhaf-Coleman FrameworkBanzhaf Numbers or ScoresDouble Banzhaf GamesParty Government in the Two German Speaking Nations
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