Contribution Mechanisms and Types of Cost Threshold in the Subscription Game with Private Information on Valuation: Public Good Experiments
- 1 Department of Public Finance, National Taipei University, New Taipei City
Abstract
This paper conducts a lab experiment to analyze individual voluntary contribution behaviors in the simultaneous and sequential contribution mechanisms with different types of the cost threshold. The experimental results show that individual contribution behaviors are different when individuals face different types of cost threshold and participate in situations with different contribution mechanisms. When the cost threshold is certain, the contribution in the simultaneous contribution mechanism is significantly higher than the contribution in the sequential contribution mechanism. Furthermore, the contribution with cost certainty is significantly higher than the contribution with cost uncertainty, whether the contribution mechanism is a simultaneous or sequential institution. As for individual characteristic variables, the study finds that the “cooperative” individual contributes more to the public goods than the “individualistic” individual does.
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