This study provides a comparative analysis of the main determinants of large shifts in aid allocation by major donors, namely China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In contrast to continuing assistance, significant year-over-year variation of allocated aid to a given recipient is considered a new and deliberate decision by the donors. Using a version of quantile regression to account for heterogeneity in the characteristics of aid recipients, we show that significant differences exist in the aid allocation strategies of the major donors. There is no conditionality attached to Chinese aid, while self-economic interests and corruption levels at home and in the recipient countries determine aid allocated by France and the U.K. to their former colonies. In addition, recipient needs affect aid from France, the U.K., and the U.S. Over the 2000-2014 period, there is no significant change in the determinants of aid allocation by China in response to various criticisms of its approach. Confronted with the growing influence of emerging donors such as China, the three major traditional donors seem to adjust their aid allocation policy towards their own economic interests.
KeywordsAid AllocationOfficial Development AssistanceChinaFranceUnited KingdomUnited StatesRecipient Countries
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