Incumbency is frequently said to advantage re-election seeker incumbents, but incumbency disadvantage can also be highlighted in some countries in several kinds of electoral contexts. This paper takes a theoretical point of view and aims at shedding light on the capacity to remain in power and on the mechanisms at stake. In an electoral competition framework with election seeker politicians, contributing lobbies and voters divided into informed and non-informed voters, this paper analy z es the dynamics of political support in a two-period model. It is shown that the dynamics of electoral promises with two groups competing for political favor generates a mechanical downward trend of political support. This trend creates an incentive not to campaign on re-election about a balance sheet of the ending mandate but rather to campaign on new projects or new themes not connected to those of the previous election campaign or even to bring new tactics onto the political scene (including the promotion of voters’ misinformation).
KeywordsElectionsLobbiesVotersElectoral PromisesPolitical Support
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