Since governments are fragmented in their components, are short-sighted and , therefore, are unwilling to undertake ways of consolidation that alleviate the burden of debt on future generations, constitutionalization makes economic sense. The problem, which does not seem to have been adequately considered, is that if it is true that existing electoral laws have led to the constitutionalization of the public budget, it is equally true that this reform of the constitution necessarily entails an adequate electoral law to avoid perennial political instability and effective fiscal consolidation. We refer to the recent Italian case and present a simple model of consensus and political stability that requires a budgetary imbalance. All this implies that the constitutionaliation of the balanced budget necessarily requires an appropriate electoral law.
KeywordsPolitical ConsensusConstitutionalizationElectoral LawFractionalization of PartiesInterest Groups
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