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Impact of Sex on Worker’s Effort within Efficiency Wage Setting
Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
Department of Economics, Catholic University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
Department of Economics, Catholic University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
- 1 Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
- 2 Department of Economics, Catholic University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
- 3 Department of Economics, Catholic University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 02 (2012)·Pages 130–132·Published 23 May 2012·DOI10.4236/tel.2012.22024
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Abstract
We provided a simple equilibrium model where both the wage paid by firms and the sexual frequency of their workers are determined in equilibrium. The analysis is carried out within an efficiency wage model where the worker’s effort is influenced, in addition to wage, by the willingness to work. The concept of equilibrium used in this paper is that of Nash.
KeywordsSexual FrequencyEfficiency WagesNash Equilibrium
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