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On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”
CORE, Universitécatholique de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium
Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
UECE/ISEG, Lisbon, Portugal
CEF.UP,University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
- 1 CORE, Universitécatholique de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium
- 2 Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
- 3 UECE/ISEG, Lisbon, Portugal
- 4 CEF.UP,University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 02 (2012)·Pages 291–293·Published 2 August 2012·DOI10.4236/tel.2012.23054
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Abstract
In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavilydestabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by thearrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly howstability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomenaaffecting the composition of the marriage market.
KeywordsMatchingStabilityMarriage ModelDivorce Cascades
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