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Emotion Interference Solves Social Dilemma
Department of Behavioral Science, Center for Experimental Research in Social Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
- 1 Department of Behavioral Science, Center for Experimental Research in Social Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 02 (2012)·Pages 446–449·Published 19 December 2012·DOI10.4236/tel.2012.25083
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Abstract
Roles of emotion in decision-making have been attracting attention in neuroeconomics and behavioral game theory. We mathematically demonstrate that “emotion interference”, a recently-discovered psychological phenomenon [1] helps to solve social dilemma in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Furthermore, the present theory also accounts for the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle in the prisoner’s dilemma [2]. Furthermore, it is also explained that why people in the society with higher social mobility are more cooperative. Relations of the present work to recently evolving fields of neuroeconomics and quantum decision theory are discussed.
KeywordsEmotionDisjunction EffectSure-Thing PrincipleNash EquilibriumQuantum InterferenceNeuroeconomics
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