Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems
- 1 Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Japan
Abstract
This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom and T. Yamato, “ Secure Implementation, ” Theoreti cal Economics , Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203- 2 29) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Z. Ritz, “ Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives, ” Mathematical Social Science , Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 155-179), both of which are necessary for secure imple - mentation, if and only if it is constant on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. Weak in - difference is weaker than minimal richness (Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, “ Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money, ” Economics Letters , Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008, pp. 91-95). Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.
- J. Suijs, “On Incentive Compatibility and Budget Balancedness in Public Decision Making,” Economic Design, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 193-209. doi:10.1007/BF02499133
- T. Saijo, T. Sj?str?m and T. Yamato, “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203-229.
- T. Cason, T. Saijo, T. Sj?str?m and T. Yamato, “Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006, pp. 206-235. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007
- D. Berga and B. Moreno, “Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences,” Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2009, pp. 275-298. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0323-y
- K. Nishizaki, “Secure Implementation in Discrete and Excludable Public Good Economies,” Osaka Economic Papers, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2011, pp. 48-56.
- H. Mizukami and T. Wakayama, “Bossiness and Implementability in Pure Exchange Economies,” Vol. 1461, 2005, pp. 126-140.
- K. Nishizaki, “An Equivalence of Secure Implementability and Full Implementability in Truthful Strategies in Pure Exchange Economies with Leontief Utility Functions,” GCOE Discussion Paper Series No. 279, Osaka University, Osaka, 2012. http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/dp/pdf/no.279_dp.pdf
- R. Kumar, “Secure Implementation in Production Economies,” Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 2011-02, Louisiana State University, Louisiana, 2009. http://bus.lsu.edu/McMillin/Working_Papers/pap11_02.pdf
- Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, “Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money,” Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008, pp. 91-95. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.009
- Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, “Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets,” Economic Theory, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2011, pp. 147-169. doi:10.1007/s00199-010-0538-x
- O. Bochet and T. Sakai, “Secure Implementation in Allotment Economies,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2010, pp. 35-49. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023
- Z. Ritz, “Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives,” Mathematical Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 155-179.
- K. Nishizaki, “Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems,” GCOE Discussion Paper Series No. 245, Osaka University, Osaka, 2012. http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/dp/pdf/no.245_dp_revised.pdf