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Which Spouse First Decides in the Household? The Dynamics of Bargaining
Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
- 1 Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
- 2 Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
- 3 Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 03 (2013)·Pages 69–77·Published 26 February 2013·DOI10.4236/tel.2013.31011
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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of which spouse first decides in the intrahousehold decision on the time that each spouse devotes to the provision of a family good. Specifically, we adopt a dynamic approach by developing a super game, with the status quo being sequential, to study the influence of the discount factor, which measures the importance of the future, on the set of sustainable agreements in intrahousehold bargaining. We first show that cooperation is eas ily sustained. We then observe a positive relationship between the discount factor and the proportion of time that the follower devotes to housework, when focusing on sustainable agreements, with this finding being maintained even if the follower has higher wages than the spouse leader.
KeywordsFamily BargainingStackelberg GameFamily Good
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