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Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a Common Resource Experiment
Department of Economics, Jaume I University, Castellón, Spain
- 1 Department of Economics, Jaume I University, Castellón, Spain
- 2
- 3
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 03 (2013)·Pages 31–39·Published 30 August 2013·DOI10.4236/tel.2013.35A2006
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Abstract
This paper studies the economical behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economical experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR taking into account the influence of economical training on the learning process of individuals regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economical knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.
KeywordsCommon-Pool ResourcesNon-Cooperatives GamesLearning Processes
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