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Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
- 1 University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
- 2
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 03 (2013)·Pages 40–44·Published 30 August 2013·DOI10.4236/tel.2013.35A2007
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Abstract
In this note, we provide a new explanation for the “failure” of plea bargaining. We show in a model of asymmetric information that a public prosecutor facing re-election takes cases to the courtroom to signal quality even when her welfare (absent retention motivation) is always higher from plea bargaining.
KeywordsPlea BargainingRe-ElectionProsecutor
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