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Privately Held or Publicly Owned? Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Department of Economics, Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon
- 1 Department of Economics, Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 04 (2014)·Pages 397–409·Published 13 June 2014·DOI10.4236/tel.2014.46051
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Abstract
This paper examines the decision to go public in the presence of large and dispersed shareholders. The decision to go public and the shape of the ownership structure itself depend on the particular combination of concentrated and dispersed ownership that maximizes the initial owners’ wealth. Owners/managers and large shareholders exert costly efforts to increase their share of the value of the public firm. The respective shares and the listing decision are affected by the efficiency of the judiciary and law enforcement system.
KeywordsOwnership StructureCorporate GovernanceAgency CostsMonitoringManagerial ConflictLegal ProtectionInvestor Protection
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