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The Promotion Rule under Imperfect Observability of the Employee’s Ability
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan
IZA, Bonn, Germany
- 1 Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan
- 2 IZA, Bonn, Germany
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 04 (2014)·Pages 662–665·Published 7 October 2014·DOI10.4236/tel.2014.48084
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Abstract
This note provides the closed-form solution for the model by Lazear [1] . The employer adjusts the performance standard for promotion when the employer observes only the imperfect index of the employee’s ability. The adjustment margin is larger when the performance depends heavily on luck and depends lightly on the employee’s ability.
KeywordsPeter PrinciplePromotionEmployer’s Learning
- Lazear, E. (2004) The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline. Journal of Political Economy, 112, S141-S163. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/379943