Using Patents in Promotional Activities
- 1 Faculty of Economics, Daito Bunka University, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
A traditional view of patents and patenting shows a trade-off between the benefit of appropriation and the cost of information revelation. However, firms may benefit from information revelation to consumers because patents can provide credible information about the firm ’ s ability to develop new technologies and produce good quality products. In fact, we frequently observe that many firms use their patents for promotion in a variety of industries, including foods, cosmetics, and electronic devices. We construct a simple model to study a usage of patents in promotion activities, a promotional patent, and investigate an advantage for a firm to employ a promotional patent. We make two findings. First, we find a positive information value of a promotional patent to a high-type firm. The benefit stems from an increase in the consumers’ willingness to pay in two ways. The expected valuation to the consumers increases because i) the patented innovation directly improves the product quality and ii) the promotional patent increases a likelihood of the firm to be a high type. The firm then absorbs the increase of the expected valuation. Second, the information value to the high-type firm is non-monotonic. The information value increases (decreases) with a prior probability that a firm is a high type when the prior probability is low (high).
- Gilbert, R. and Shapiro, C. (1990) Optimal Patent Length and Breadth. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 106-112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555497
- Klemperer, P. (1990) How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? The RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 113-130. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555498
- Lerner, J. (1994) The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis. The RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 319-333. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555833
- Scotchmer, S. (1999) On the Optimality of the Patent System. The RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 181-196. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2556076
- Horstmann, I., MacDonald, G. and Slivinski, A. (1985) Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 837-858. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261338
- Choi, J. (1998) Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism. The American Economic Review, 88, 1249-1263.
- Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1987) R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation. American Economic Review, 77, 402-420.
- Dasgupta, P. (1988) Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games. Economic Journal, 98, 66-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2233511
- Gallini, N. (1992) Patent Policy and Costly Imitation. The RAND Journal of Economics, 23, 53-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2555432
- Long, C. (2002) Patent Signals. The University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 625-679. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1600501
- Mann, R. and Sager, T. (2007) Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups. Research Policy, 36, 193-208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2006.10.002
- Hsu, D. and Ziedonis, R. (2008) Patents as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings.
- Reitzig, M. (2003) What Determines Patent Value? Insights from the Semiconductor Industry. Research Policy, 32, 13-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00193-7
- Institute of Intellectual Property (2010) Promotion of Intellectual Property Strategies of Companies.
- Aoki, R. and Spiegel, Y. (2000) Pre-grant Patent Publication and Cumulative Innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 333-345. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.10.002