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Revenue Sharing in a Sports League with an Open Market in Playing Talent: A Comment
School of Kinesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
- 1 School of Kinesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 06 (2016)·Pages 1337–1340·Published 11 November 2016·DOI10.4236/tel.2016.66123
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Abstract
Szymanski [1] and Szymanski and Késenne [2] showed that, in the standard model of a sports league, gate revenue sharing will tend to increase competitive imbalance between weak and strong teams, a seemingly perverse result. Dobson and Goddard [3] claim that “this analysis is flawed. If the revenue function is specified appropriately, gate revenue sharing always reduces competitive inequality.” This comment points out the analytical error in their paper which leads to their erroneous conclusion. Once their error is corrected, it is shown that the earlier results stand.
KeywordsProfessional Team SportsRevenue SharingCompetitive Inequality
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- Dobson, S. and Goddard, J. (2014) Revenue Sharing in a Sports League with an Open Market in Playing Talent. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 410-414. https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2014.46052
- Szymanski, S. (2004) Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle. Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 111-126. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002503261485