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A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
School of Management, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA
Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
- 1 Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
- 2 School of Management, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA
- 3 Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Theoretical Economics Letters·Volume 07 (2017)·Pages 1505–1510·Published 30 June 2017·DOI10.4236/tel.2017.75101
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Abstract
Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.
KeywordsIncentivesTrust GameGift-Exchange Game
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