A Note on Time Discretion and the Welfare Cost of Lump-Sum Taxation
- 1 Department of Economics, Farmingdale State College, State University of New York, Farmingdale, NY, USA
Abstract
The lump-sum tax is broadly regarded by standard optimal tax theory as the only non-distortionary tax instrument; any other tax instrument distorts relative prices and thus creates a deadweight loss. This paper discusses an unintended effect of lump-sum taxation that can be considered a distortion of the time endowment. Whenever this tax exceeds the amount of non-labor income, it reduces the taxpayer’s ability to freely allocate her time endowment. As long as the taxpayer assigns a positive value to time discretion, the lump-sum tax creates a welfare cost that has not been identified in the relevant literature. The welfare cost of the lump-sum tax could plausibly be greater than the traditional measure of deadweight loss of an equal yield labor income tax, which does not affect time discretion. Since the lump-sum tax does not unambiguously lead to a greater welfare level, we can conclude that it is not a proper efficiency standard at low levels of non-labor income. The same argument can be used to call for caution in the use of taxes based on the value of assets that are not the source of income flows, like owner-occupied property taxes and some types of wealth taxes. At low levels of non-labor income, these tax instruments will also have a negative effect on time discretion.
- Auerbach, A. and Hines, J. (2002) Taxation and Economic Efficiency. In: Auerbach, A. and Feldstein, M., Eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1347-1421.
- International Labour Organization (1930) Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029
- Vickery, C. (1977) The Time-Poor: A New Look at Poverty. The Journal of Human Resources, 12, 27-48. https://doi.org/10.2307/145597
- Antonopoulos, R., Masterson, T. and Zacharias, A. (2012) The Interlocking of Time and Income Deficits: Revisiting Poverty Measurement, Informing Policy Responses. Undoing Knots, Innovating for Change 3, United Nations Development Programme. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/gender/Gender%20and%20Poverty%20Reduction /Time%20deficits%20poverty.pdf
- Merz, J. and Rathjen, T. (2014) Time and Income Poverty: An Interdependent Multidimensional Poverty Approach with German Time Use Diary Data. Review of Income and Wealth, 60, 450-479. https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12117
- Mankiw, N.G., Weinzierl, M. and Yagan, D. (2009) Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, 147-174. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.4.147
- Pagano, M.A. and Jacob, B. (2010) Framing the Political Economy of Property Taxation and Land Taxation. In: Bahl, R., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Youngman, J., Eds., Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on the Property Tax, Lincoln Institute of Land Policies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 269-292.