In this paper, we examine the relationship between board busyness and firm performance for BSE 500 companies in India from 2009-2013. We find that over one third of the directors are busy in India and about three fourth of them hold up to 5 directorships. For all firms, we find that there is a weak positive relationship between board busyness and firm performance, while for non-financial firms, the relationship between board busyness and corporate performance is virtually absent. Further, we find that it is the CEO busyness and not board busyness, which adversely affects firm performance in India.
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