Addressing Asymmetries in the Eurozone
- 1 Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Peloponnese, Corinth, Greece
- 2 Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Komotini, Greece
- 3 Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Komotini, Greece
Abstract
Asymmetries in the Eurozone are high and the whole undertaking is at the crossroads. On one hand, one of its countries, namely Germany, seems to enjoy current account and budget surpluses, mainly as a result of a strong global demand for high quality German exports, an undervalued single currency, low interest rates, domestic wage restraint and a high domestic saving rate. On the other hand, persistent German surpluses associated with the not-as-good performance of the other economies make it harder for the Eurozone as a whole to recover. The European Union (EU) has tried to create a proper economic and banking union after the crisis. This attempt seems to have not been fully successful for some of the countries. At the same time, the attempts to impose austerity measures caused to a large extent an incremental rise inskepticismin Europe. The purpose of this paper is to record the prevailing asymmetries in the Eurozone, to estimate the priorities and the different maximization functions of the member countries and investigate alternative scenarios that can be followed. It is also to understand and possibly interpret the dilemmas of the German economic policy in depth, as it is the strongest economy in the Eurozone and hence anticipation was created that it would play the role of the steam engine—not necessarily within Europe only. The set of decisions that could have been taken is in the spotlight again especially due to the fear that at least the financial markets—if not the economies as a whole—are entering into a declining pattern again.
- Shambaugh, J. (2012) The Euro’s Three Crises. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 157-231. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2012.0006
- Frankel, J. (2012) Could Eurobonds Be the Answer to the Eurozone Crisis? VoxEU. http://voxeu.org/article/could-eurobonds-be-answer-eurozone-crisis
- Frankel, J. (2015) The Euro Crisis: Where to from Here? Journal of Policy Modeling, 37, 428-444.
- Pérez-Caldentey, E. and Vernengo, M. (2012) The Euro Imbalances and Financial Deregulation: A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of the European Debt Crisis. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Working Paper 702. http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_702.pdf
- De Grauwe, P. (2013) Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can They Be Fixed? LEQS Paper 57, 1-40.
- Bénassy-Quéré, A. and Ragot, X. (2015) A Policy Mix for the Eurozone. Notes of the Council of Economic Analysis, 21, 1-12.
- Rannenberg, A., Christian, S. and Strasky, J. (2014) The Macroeconomic Effects of the European Monetary Union’s Fiscal Consolidation from 2011 to 2013: A Quantitative Assessment. https://sites.google.com/site/ansgarrannenberg/research
- Botta, A. (2014) Structural Asymmetries at the Roots of the Eurozone Crisis: What’s New for Industrial Policy in the EU. PSL Quarterly Review, 67, 169-216. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420168
- Rodrik, D. (2013) The Euro Crisis, Portugal, and Europe’s Future. www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Presentations/The-Euro-Crisis-Portugal-and-the-Future-of-Europe.pdf
- Copelovitch, Μ., Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2016) The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis. Comparative Political Studies, 49, 811-840. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633227
- Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W.E. (2013) Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints. Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 1387-1405. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.822824
- Krugman, P.R. (1999) What Economists Can Learn from Evolutionary Theorists. In: Groenewegen, J. and Vromen, J.J., Eds., Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1729.
- Truger, A. (2013) Austerity in the Euro Area: The Sad State of Economic Policy in Germany and the EU. Institute for International Political Economy Berlin, Working Paper, No. 22/2013, 1-29. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/75290/1/749876956.pdf https://doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2013.02.02