An Axiomatic Characterization of the Leximin Choice Rule
- 1 Aomori Public University, Aomori, Japan
Abstract
This study discusses the characterization of the lexicographic maximin (leximin) choice rule using an axiom related to the Lorenz criterion, which states that a utility vector that Lorentz dominates a solution vector should not be Pareto dominated by any feasible vector, named Pareto Undominatedness of Lorenz-superior Distribution (PULSD). PULSD in itself does not imply that a solution vector of the choice rule is Lorenz undominated by any utility vectors in th e feasible set. Therefore, we may say that the PULSD’s requirement for inequality aversion is weak. Indeed, PULSD is consistent with the utilitarian choice rule, which is viewed as indifferent to equity. We show that the leximin choice rule is characterized by PULSD, combined with the Suppes-Se n optimality and the common ordinal invariance axiom.
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