Concealed Integrity Monitoring for Wireless Sensor Networks
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Abstract
Nowadays, sensor networks are widely installed around the world. Typical sensors provide data for healthcare, energy management, environmental monitoring, etc. In the future sensors will become a part of critical infrastructures. In such a scenario the network operator has to monitor the integrity of the network devices, otherwise the trustworthiness of the whole system is questionable. The problem is that every integrity protocol needs a secure channel between the devices. Therefore, we will introduce a covert channel for hidden transportation of integrity monitoring messages. The covert channel enables us to hide integrity check messages embedded into regular traffic without giving potential attackers a hint on the used integrity protocol.
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